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Abstract 
There is certainly something fashionable about constructivism in science education 
nowadays. It is further true that constructivism is by no means a consistent movement, there 
are many variants of this view in use. Furthermore, it appears that constructivism, for some 
science educators, in any case, has become the new ideology of science education that 
provides a cure for every problem of teaching and learning science. But without any doubt 
constructivism has become also a most valuable guideline for science education -- for science 
teaching and learning as well as for research in these fields. This paper attempts to review the 
myths, the misunderstandings, the polemics and the serious critiques concerning 
constructivism. It will be argued in favor of a consistent and "moderate" constructivist view in 
science education that in fact may provide substantial progress in our field and which major 
features will be among the valuable views of science education even after the term 
constructivism will have gone out of fashion. 
 
Key-words: constructivism, science education, conceptual change. 
 
Resumen 
Seguramente hay algo de modismo respecto al constructivismo en enseñanza de las 
ciencias en los días de hoy. Es también cierto que el constructivismo no es, de ninguna 
manera, un movimiento consistente; existen muchas variantes de esa visión en uso. Además, 
parece que para algunos educadores en ciencias el constructivismo se ha convertido en una 
nueva ideología capaz de curar todos los problemas de enseñanza y aprendizaje de ciencias. 
Por otra parte, sin duda, el constructivismo se ha convertido en una valiosa guía para la 
educación en ciencias - tanto para la enseñanza y el aprendizaje de ciencias como para la 
investigación en estas áreas. Este artículo intenta revisar los mitos, los malentendidos, las 
polémicas y las serias críticas acerca del constructivismo. Se argumentará en favor de una 
visión constructivista consciente y “moderada” en la educación en ciencias, que de hecho 
pueda fornecer un progreso sustancial en el área y que cuyos rasgos principales puedan 
permanecer entre las posturas valiosas en la educación en ciencias, aún después que el 
término constructivismo haya pasado de moda. 
Palabras-clave: constructivismo, enseñanza de las ciencias, cambio conceptual. 
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On the meaning of the constructivist view in science education  
 
It has to be pointed out from the outset that the constructivist view primarily 
concerns a particular way of conceptualizing knowledge and knowledge acquisition 
(i.e. learning). It is a view of the nature of knowledge and its development, it is based 
on a certain epistemology (i.e., a theory of knowledge). The constructivist view comes 
in many variants in science education literature on students' learning (Good, 
Wandersee, & Julien, 1993). It is based on a number of quite different philosophical 
perspectives that share a common "constructivist core". Matthews (1993) mentions the 
following positions: Piaget's genetic epistemology, the new theories of science 
movement in the '60s and '70s that may be indicated by names like T.S. Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, Lakatos and others, the new sociology of science, postmodernist views 
about science, Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs, and social constructivism, 
especially the theory of language acquisition by Vygotsky. The common constructivist 
core is a "view of human knowledge as a process of personal cognitive construction, or 
invention, undertaken by the individual who is trying, for whatever purpose, to make 
sense of her social or natural environment." (Taylor, 1993, 268). In other words: 
knowledge is not viewed as some sort of a true copy of features of the world outside 
but as construction of the individual. Knowledge acquisition (i.e. learning) is not the 
transfer of "nuggets of truth" (as Kelly, 1955, put it) to the individual but a personal 
construction by the individual. The learner is not seen as a passive receiver but as an 
active constructor of knowledge.  
 
Radical constructivism  
In science (and mathematics) education von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism 
(von Glasersfeld, 1989, 1992, in press) is most often employed as reference position of 
the constructivist view. Radical constructivism deliberately is an epistemology, a 
theory of knowledge, more precisely a theory of "experiential" knowledge. This 
knowledge is seen as tentative human construction on the basis of the already existing 
knowledge. The tentative, provisional character of experiential knowledge is of great 
importance. It leads to the denial that there may be ultimate truth for this kind of 
knowledge. That there may be such a kind of truth in the field of religious beliefs, 
however, is not questioned. The tentative character concerns every kind of experiential 
knowledge, knowledge constructed by the individual and science knowledge as well. 
Also the latter is viewed as human construction on the basis of the conceptions and 
ideas the individual scientist or the respective scientific community holds.  
 
There are three key principles of radical constructivism. The first states that 
knowledge is not passively received but is built up by the cognizing subject. According 
to this principle it is not possible to transfer ideas into students' heads intact, rather 
students construct their own meanings from the words or visual images they hear or 
see. What the learners already know is of key importance in this construction process. 
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The second principle states that  the function of cognition is adaptive and 
enables the learners to construct viable explanations of experiences. Knowledge of the 
world outside, hence, is viewed as human tentative construction. A 'reality' outside is 
not denied but it is only possible to know about that reality in a personal and subjective 
way. There is sometimes the misunderstanding that this principle argues in favor of 
"anything goes" so to speak, that every human construction is allowed. This is 
definitely not the case. The constructions have to be "viable". This term is based on an 
analogy to the development of the species in evolution. Only those species "survive" 
that are adapted best to the environment. Per analogicam: only those constructions are 
"viable" that prove to be useful for the constructor. 
 
Von Glasersfeld likes to call the first principle the trivial constructivist principle 
in order to lead attention to the crucial importance of the second one. But the term 
"trivial constructivism" appears to be "ill-chosen" (Ernest, 1993; see similar arguments 
by Solomon, 1994, 14). First, it is far from being trivial to put this principle into 
practice as will be outlined below. Secondly, there are strong logical relations between 
the two principles. The key idea is in some way already in the first principle, the 
second one may well be viewed as a further elaboration of the first. 
 
Radical constructivism as proposed by von Glasersfeld implicitly includes a 
third principle. It highlights that although individuals have to construct their own 
meaning of a new phenomenon or idea, the process of constructing meaning always is 
embedded within a social setting of which the individual is part.  
 
Critiques of radical constructivism  
Radical constructivism has come under attack recently from a number of 
philosophical and pedagocical perspectives (for a review of these critiques see Duit, 
1993a). Suchting (1992) provides a most rigorous critique of that approach. Very 
briefly summarized (Duit, Treagust, & Fraser, in press), he concludes that 
constructivism has to be seen as a doctrine that is simply unintelligible and confused 
and does not successfully address the key problem of intersubjectivity. The weakness 
of radical constructivist philosophy's terminology allows trivializations of the main 
ideas in such a way that at the very end they are shared by everyone. In fact, there are 
key weaknesses in von Glasersfeld's position as is worked out in a number of other 
publications (Nüse, Gröben, Freitag, & Schreiber, 1992; Matthews, 1993). But a 
certain number of the problems addressed in the critiques appear to concern 
philosophical subtleties. The key ideas as included in the above principles of radical 
constructivism seem not to be questioned in principle by the critics. The claim that 
they are shared by almost everyone and hence are without any value (see also Strike, 
1987) needs a closer look. Of course, this line of critique should be taken seriously in 
order to develop the epistemological underpinnings of constructivism further. But in 
view of science instruction it has to be regarded that the principles of radical 
constructivism as stated above are not at all shared by everyone who is involved in 
science education. It is a well established empirical finding now that at least many Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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science teachers (and students alike) hold rather naive views of knowledge 
construction and limited views of the nature and range of science (Lederman, 1992; 
Baird & White, in press). There are further findings (e.g. Fischler, 1993) that teachers 
who "learned" the constructivist view, i.e., expressed this view in interviews, do not 
necessarily act according to it in classroom situations. In general, there are many 
difficulties to set constructivist principles into practice (Tobin, 1993a). 
 
It is a common feature of critiques on radical constructivism that this position is 
accused of leading to the denial of the existence of the physical world outside (Goldin, 
1989; Suchting, 1992; Matthews, 1993). Ernest (1993) points out that this is an 
incorrect conclusion, because von Glasersfeld points out in a number of articles that 
radical constructivism is ontological neutral (von Glasersfeld, 1992, 32). All it denies 
is the possibility of any certain knowledge of that reality. That means that the 
constructivist view does not necessarily lead to an idealist position but is also 
compatible with a critical realist view. 
 
Another line of critique that is of great importance for employing the 
constructivist view in science education concerns the interplay of the individual and 
the social in radical constructivism. It appears that radical constructivism puts its main 
emphasis on the individual and hardly pays only to the social aspects (Solomon, 1994, 
15). Social issues are usually of a marginal type in writings on radical constructivism -
- although von Glasersfeld (in press) always explicitly admits that the social context 
which the individual learners are part of when they construct knowledge is an 
important issue. Phenomenological (Marton & Neuman, 1989) as well as social 
constructivist perspectives (Glasson & Lalik, 1992) argue that the radical 
constructivist approach leads to the separation of the individual from the world. 
O'Loughlin (1992) adds another important issue. He admits that the emphasis on 
students' own activity in constructivism in fact may empower students to take 
responsibility for their own learning but he also claims that it has to be taken into 
account that a certain amount of power is put on students to be active. The emphasis 
on the individual is questioned also from another vantage point. Self-activity may lead 
to overlooking the point that a substantial amount of guidance is necessary to make 
students able to construct desirable conceptions. Activity theory  (Wolze & 
Walgenbach, 1992) views "self-development" and "being-developed" as 
complementary issues in knowledge construction. In constructivism there is a 
tendency to overemphasize the "self-development" side. 
 
 
On the common core of the constructivist view as used in science education  
 
In summarizing what has been presented above it has to be stated another time 
that the constructivist view primarily concerns a particular theory of knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition. Consequences drawn from this view for science teaching and 
learning in general that are usually discussed under headings like "constructivist 
science instruction" go far beyond epistemological issues and issues of knowledge 
acquisition. As will be outlined in more detail below they mostly concern the Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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arrangement of conditions that support students' constructions on the basis of their 
already existing knowledge. There appear to be four main facets of the view of 
knowledge under review here. 
 
(1) Active construction on the basis of the already existing conceptions. Students have 
to construct the new knowledge actively by themselves on the grounds of the already 
existing knowledge. There is no learning from scratch, there is no simple transfer of 
pieces of knowledge from a certain source to the learner. The already existing 
knowledge (students' prior conceptions) have proven to be both the necessary building 
blocks and empediments of learning. As will be discussed below many students' prior 
science conceptions are in stark contrast to the science conceptions to be learned 
(compare the list of key findings of students' conceptions research in the appendix). 
Changing from these conceptions to science conceptions is not easy, sometimes not 
even likely, because the already existing conceptions provide the goggles, so to speak, 
for seeing the new conceptions presented by the teacher, a textbook or the like. 
Ausubel's (1968, vi) famous dictum "The most important single factor influencing 
learning is what the learner already knows. Ascertain this and teach him accordingly" 
points to the key importance of the already existing knowledge. The more recent 
developments in constructivist oriented science education research have revealed what 
the learner already knows in major science domains, and have also led to t he 
development and evaluation of new approaches to what "teach him accordingly" may 
mean. 
 
(2) Tentative construction . All knowledge or ideas constructed by the individual about 
traits of the world outside or about ideas another may have is tentative in nature. It is 
hypothetical and may need minor or major changes when other evidences become 
available. Also science knowledge as accepted today in scientific communities in 
principle is tentative in nature and open for revision. 
 
(3) Viability. Knowledge and ideas that have been constructed need to be viable, i.e., 
useful for the individual (or a group of individuals respectively). Students may, for 
instance, construct what they like but then they run the risk of not being understood by 
others. Only constructs that stand the test of being viable survive so to speak. 
 
(4) Social construction. Although every individual has to construct knowledge by her 
or himself the construction process always also has a social component. Knowledge is 
always constructed within a certain social setting.  
 
The constructivist view though still in need of further refinements has proven to 
be a most valuable (viable) guide for student centred pedagogy in science education, 
i.e., for science education that is oriented towards the needs and interests of students. 
In the following, first key findings of research on students' conceptions in science that 
clearly show the importance of prior knowledge as determining factor in learning will 
be outlined. Afterwards characteristics of new constructivist approaches of science 
instruction and of teacher education will be presented. 
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The constructivist view as consistent interpretation pattern for results of 
empirical studies on students' conceptions and their development 
 
A large number of empirical studies on science related students' conceptions 
have been published over the past two decades. The recent edition of the bibliography 
by Pfundt and Duit (1994) contains more than 2000 entries of this kind. The results of 
these studies (see for a brief summary of key findings the appendix of this paper) may 
be taken as a convincing set of evidence in favor of the constructivist view outlined 
above. In other words, the findings may be interpreted in a rather consistent way by 
that view. In the following main findings concerning the significant importance of the 
prior conceptions as determining factors of learning will be outlined. 
 
Conception and perception 
The constructivist view as outlined above claims that the conceptions held 
guide or even determine the sense making process, i.e., the interpretation of sense data 
(like visual or audio data). It is well known from neurophysiological research that our 
senses like the eye or the ear are by no means passive receivers but are very active in 
the process of seeing and hearing (Zeki, 1992). In other words, there is no objective 
one-to-one representation of features outside us when we see or hear something. Every 
act of seeing and hearing includes interpretation. 
 
Gestalt theory has claimed that perception is  very much influenced by 
conception. Hanson (1965) has created the term of "theory laden observation". He 
points out that observation is very much influenced by the "theory" employed when 
observations are made. In fact, it is an everyday experience that different persons 
observing the same event report different issues. Every judge knows that reports of 
witnesses of the same event may be very different. The incoming sense data are so rich 
in information that it is absolutely necessary to reduce this richness, to put emphasis 
on some facets only.  
 
In science education, experiments play a key role. Usually it is taken for 
granted that all students actually observe the same facets that are so obviously to be 
seen from the point of view of the teacher. But there is research showing that this is 
not necessarily the case. The conceptions students hold, in other words, the way 
student "view" an event, influence what is observed. Only one example will be given 
here. A thin metal wire is connected to a battery. When the circuit is closed, the wire is 
heated and starts glowing. Where does it glow up first? Students were asked to make a 
prediction, the experiment was then carried out. Students who predicted that the wire 
would glow up first at the end of the wire where, so to speak, the current enters it, 
actually observed this (Schlichting, 1991). There are other equally striking examples in 
the literature that conception influences perception. Recently Brewer and Lambert 
(1993) have critically analyzed research in the field of psychology that has addressed Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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the theory-ladenness of observation as outlined above. They came to the following 
conclusion: 
 
"However the data also suggest that top-down influences on perception are only 
strong when the incoming sensory input is weak or ambiguous. Thus, in cases where 
the bottom-up sensory evidence is strong and unambiguous, there is little evidence that 
theory can override observation, and so the data do not support the strong form of the 
theory-laden position attributed to Hanson and Kuhn." (Brewer & Lambert, 1993, 254) 
 
The results available from constructivist science education research appear to 
be totally in accordance with this conclusion. That means, that there is only a strong 
influence of prior conceptions, if the phenomena observed are somewhat ambiguous. 
This is, for instance, undoubtedly true in the case of the wire glowing up discussed 
above. It is difficult to see that the wire glows up at all spots at the same time because 
our eyes always only concentrate on one spot.  Nevertheless, the issue of theory 
ladenness of observation should be given attention in science instruction and in 
research on students' understanding. 
 
 
Conception and action 
 
There is a lot of evidence that students' problem solving behavior is very much 
influenced by the conceptions they hold. A paradigmatic study has been carried out by 
Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1976). Two groups of children, four years old and eight 
years old, were asked to find out the equilibrium point of a number of metal bars. All 
bars looked alike but some had an extra load hidden on one side or a hole in the inner 
part. Therefore, the equilibrium point of these bars is not in the middle.  
 
The younger children had no problems at all in finding the points of 
equilibrium. They simply used a trial-and-error-strategy. In contrast, the older children 
had difficulties. They had a "theory" that namely the equilibrium point has to be in the 
middle. The study shows that prior conceptions may strongly influence problem 
solving behavior and also points out that prior conceptions may distort solving a 
problem totally. 
 
 
Conception may override empirical evidence 
 
It is a very popular strategy among science teachers to arrange a cognitive 
conflict by using conflicting empirical evidence. Even if students really observe that 
there is a conflict that does not necessarily mean that they are convinced that their 
conception was not adequate. It is much more likely that one single conflict does not 
convince students. They rather try to get rid of the unexpected outcome by all sorts of 
ad-hoc arguments. There is, for instance, a 12-year old student in a study by 
Tiberghien (1980) who is asked to find out whether an iceblock covered with wool or 
covered with aluminum foil will melt first. The student  thinks that the iceblock Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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covered with wool will melt first, because wool "gives" heat (it makes us warm if we 
wear it). This is an interesting example for the impact of everyday sense experiences 
on students' conceptions. But even more interesting is the students' behavior when she 
found out that her prediction was wrong, that the iceblock covered with aluminum foil 
melts first. She creates a number of arguments that in this particular situation the 
observed outcome would occur but not in other situations. 
 
 
Conception guides learning 
 
Research on students' (alternative) conceptions in science has revealed that 
students prior conceptions severely influence, even determine learning of the science 
conceptions presented in class, in textbooks or the like. It is one of the "sad" messages 
from this research that science instruction appears in general not to be too successful in 
guiding students from their preinstructional conceptions to the science conceptions. 
Research has also revealed why this is the case. Students are not able to understand the 
science view as presented because the science view is very often embedded into a 
totally different framework. Science learning then, in most cases that are of 
significance, is not of a simple enlargement (or even of a learning by rote) type but 
needs what has been called "conceptual change" learning (see below). This kind of 
learning requires a fundamental restructuring of the existing conceptual structure 
before students are able to really understand the questions asked by the teacher in the 
classroom and get an idea what a presented information may mean. 
 
Many studies in science education research on students' conceptions are still 
quite narrow in scope when the impact of prior conceptions on learning science 
conceptions is involved. First, science learning does not only mean to learn science 
concepts of a content level type, i.e., concepts of light, combustion, or photosynthesis. 
Learning science should also include learning about science, i.e, about world views 
science has to offer (in other words to learn philosophy of science issues), and learning 
science should also comprise attempts to make students familiar with a view of their 
learning processes that may contribute to more effective learning in general. 
Concerning both aspects students usually hold limited and naive views. Research has 
shown that also here conceptual change learning has to take place that changes from 
prior everyday views of science and everyday views of learning are difficult because 
the prior view determine the learning process. Secondly, among the preinstructional 
conceptions that may influence (impede or support) learning of science concepts and 
principles are not only students' alternative conceptions of the phenomena, concepts 
and principles in question but also conceptions of a more general kind, among them 
general schemes of thinking (like thinking in chains of causal events; see Andersson, 
1986; Ogborn, Mariani, & Martins, 1994) as well as "philosophy of science" related 
beliefs and ideas (for a review see Lederman, 1992). The constructivist view has led 
attention to the sketched broader view of the significance of prior conceptions on 
learning as will be discussed later in more detail when characteristics of constructivist 
science teaching will be outlined. 
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The hermeneutic circle 
 
It is the key issue of the findings presented in the preceding section that 
interpretation is only possible on the basis of the conceptions available to be employed 
in that interpretation process. This leads to a circle of understanding understanding that 
is known as the hermeneutic circle. The word "hermeneutic" is of Greek origin, the 
meaning of hermeneutic circle simply is "circle of interpretation". The circle-like 
nature of interpretation processes is illustrated by the communication situation 
between two interlocutors, e.g., a teacher (or interviewer) and a student. The verbal 
and non-verbal information sent out by one participant is interpreted by the other 
within his or her framework. The response sent out then is interpreted by the other 
commonly in a slightly or even totally different framework. If the sketched 
communication situation is analyzed in more detail, there are sense making processes 
(i.e., understanding processes) involved that are embedded in different frames of 
reference. The questions posed or the verbal stimuli provided by the teacher or the 
researcher are embedded in their frame of reference, i.e., in their science point of view. 
The students are able to make sense of the questions posed or the stimuli provided 
only on the basis of their preconceptions, i.e., within the frame of reference of their 
already existing conceptions. The reactions they give, therefore, make full sense only 
within the frame of reference of their preconceptions. The teacher or the researcher is 
able to make sense of the students' reactions only on the basis of her or his 
conceptions. Therefore, the students' reactions in the classroom as well as in research 
situations are very often interpreted within a frame of reference that is partly or even 
totally different from the frame of reference in which they were created. 
Misunderstandings then are unavoidable. If the dialogue continues, an "endless" chain 
of misunderstandings may be the result. 
 
The circle of understanding is a most important tool for looking at learning in 
science from a constructivist perspective. It facilitates understanding of many attempts 
to teach science in that teaching may fail simply because students and teacher only 
partly understand one another or do not understand one another at all. Endless chains 
of misunderstandings appear to be a frequent feature of science classes. The circle also 
provides a powerful tool for planning research and for interpreting the results. 
Interviews, for instance, are used most often in research studies on students' 
conceptions in science (they are the "workhorse" of that research as Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1993, put it). There are several hermeneutical circles involved 
when interviews are used. Interviewer and student have to make very fast 
interpretations of the others' responses. Because there is not much time to think about 
what the other may have meant, in interviews frequently misunderstandings occur (see 
for examples Duit, 1993b). Interviews are usually tape recorded and then transcribed. 
It has to be taken into consideration that also this process is an interpretation. A 
transcript necessarily is not as rich in information as compared to the original situation. 
Furthermore not all passages are clearly understandable. Therefore, there is the danger 
that the transcriber writes down something quite different from what has been said. Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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When the transcript is interpreted the research and the interview documents are the 
"partners" in the circle. It has to be taken into consideration that what the researcher 
usually likes to call students' conceptions actually are his or her conceptions of 
students' conceptions (for the issue of "conception of conception" see also Marton, 
1981). Of course, similar considerations concern every method employed to 
investigate students' conceptions and their development (Duit, 1993b; for a review of 
methods used in science education research on students' conceptions see Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1993, and Duit, Treagust, & Mansfield, in press; for an 
introduction into the practice of using these methods see White & Gunstone, 1992). 
 
 
 
Characteristics of constructivist science instruction 
 
Constructivisms as part of a movement towards student-centred science instruction 
 
 
The common core of the constructivist view as outlined above first and 
foremost provides a view of learning that allows to interpret (and hence understand) 
students' learning difficulties as revealed by the many studies available in a consistent 
manner and also provides guidelines for developing more efficient teaching and 
learning strategies. In a rigid sense, there is no constructivist learning. Learning 
whenever it happens (and it happens also, even successfully, in more traditionally 
oriented approaches) is viewed as active construction by the learner. In that more rigid 
sense the constructivist view does not favor any approach of learning science. But the 
idea inherent in constructivism of taking the students' beliefs and conceptions serious 
has led to developments towards making the constructivist view a genuine part of 
attempts towards student-centred pedagogy of science instruction. The focus here is on 
the students, their interests, their learning skills, and their needs in a broad sense. 
Science instruction from that perspective aims at providing students with science 
knowledge in such a way that they understand not only the science concepts and 
principles rather than learning definitions and formulas by heart but also understand in 
which way science knowledge is of significance for their lives and for the lives of all 
other human beings. The focus of such a science instruction is not solely the 
significance of certain content domains in the sciences, i.e., students introduction into 
the cultural heritage that science knowledge provides but also the significance of 
science for the individual and society in general. Constructivism therefore has become 
part of a broad movement in science education towards "science for all" (Fensham, 
1986), i.e., towards making science knowledge more meaningful and hence more 
significant that may be indicated by gender inclusive science instruction, and the 
developments that take place under the label of STS (the interplay of science, 
technology and society; Fensham, 1991; Yager, 1993). In the following, key 
characteristics of such a constructivist science education will be outlined. 
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Constructivist approaches aim at changes of several facets of science education 
 
The aims of constructivist science instruction are fundamentally different from 
more traditionally oriented approaches. They are student centred in the above broad 
sense. Understanding science in the deep way aimed at in constructivist approaches 
goes far beyond parrot like repetition of definitions, formulas and the like. It includes 
applications of science knowledge for the mentioned purposes, and also incorporates 
views about science and meta-cognitive issue. The aim is further a reflective learner 
who is aware of the strength and limitations of her or his thinking.  
 
In order to address these aims constructivist approaches usually put emphasis 
on changes at several levels and aspects of science education. In table 1 some key 
contrasting aspects of traditional and constructivist science education are given. This 
table stems from a holistic constructivist approach that Duschl and Gitomer (1991) call 
"portfolio culture". The term portfolio will be briefly explained below (see in the 
paragraph on assessment), the "label  culture is meant to convey an image of a 
classroom learning environment that reflects a comprehensive interplay between 
teacher, student, and curriculum" (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991, 848).  
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The view of science content in constructivist science education 
 
It has already been outlined that science knowledge also has to be viewed as 
tentative human construction from the constructivist perspective. That means that the 
idea that there is a true content structure in a particular content domain has to be 
rejected. What is commonly called the science content structure is the consensus of the 
particular scientific community. Every presentation of this consensus, including the 
presentations in the leading textbooks, is an ideosyncratic reconstruction by the 
referring authors informed by the specific aims the authors explicitly or implicitly 
hold. Therefore, there is no "right" content structure that may form the basis for a 
certain module of science instruction. If the aims of reconstruction are different, this 
process will result in emphasizing, at least slightly, different facets. In other words, 
every science instruction has to be based on a careful reconstruction of the referring 
pieces of science content structure that is understood as the accepted consensus in the 
scientific community in the above sense. But the reconstruction is very much 
influenced by the aims of instruction, there is an intimate interplay of issues of the 
reconstructer's views of subject matter content, of students' conceptions, of students' 
interests, and his or her view of learning science in general. 
 
The constructivist view, for instance, does not only provide a new means of 
thinking about learning but also of viewing science content: "....we knew that our 
views of learning affect our teaching, but now we see that they also affect our 
perceptions of content...." (Fensham, Gunstone, & White, 1994, 1). An approach of 
"educational reconstruction" worked out by Kattmann (1992) and Duit and Komorek 
(1994) explicitly includes students' conceptions of various kinds in the process of 
reconstruction of science content. Experiences of mathematics educators (Confrey, 
1990 as well as Steffe & D'Ambrosio, in press) could be reconfirmed that viewing 
science content from the students' perspectives does not only facilitate a more 
adequate reconstruction but may also enhance the reconstructers' understanding of the 
referring science (or mathematics) content.  
 
Constructivist approaches usually include careful analyses of traditional 
reconstructions and the development of new reconstructions under the perspective of 
the aims set for the particular instructional unit. A careful reconstruction has proven to 
be of key significance. Brown & Clement (1992), for instance, report of a 
constructivist teaching approach towards learning issues of Newton's Third Law. This 
approach was only sufficiently successful after the science content structure had 
undertaken another attempt of careful reconstruction. 
 
The interplay of pedagogical and science related issues in reconstruction of 
science content has been extensively discussed under the label of "content specific 
pedagogical knowledge" (Shulman, 1986). The idea here is that teachers do not only 
need sufficient science content knowledge on the one and pedagogical knowledge on 
the other hand but also knowledge of the interplay between the two domains (Cochran, 
1991). Teachers' pedagogical content knowledge has proven to be the key factor in Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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new teaching and learning approaches under a constructivist perspective (Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1993). 
 
 
Conceptual change and conceptual change supporting conditions  
 
Learning from the constructivist perspective may be viewed in terms of 
students' pathways from certain pieces of their already existing conceptual structure 
towards science conceptions. In principle two kinds of pathways may be differentiated: 
via enrichment (or enlargement), i.e., via minor revisions, or via major restructuring, 
conceptual change, of the already existing. There are a number of other terms in use to 
indicate this differentiation (Duit, 1994), namely continuous (or evolutionary) versus 
discontinuous (revolutionary) pathways (see below). The distinction of evolution and 
revolution has been employed in alluding to Kuhn's (1970) types of paradigm shift. 
Quite often similarities of this distinction and Piaget's (1985) differentiation between 
assimilation and accommodation are also referred to. Undoubtedly the learning of 
most key science concepts and principles is of the conceptual change type, i.e., is in 
need of major restructuring of the already existing conceptual structure.  
 
 
According to the theory of conceptual change as developed by Posner, Strike, 
Hewson & Gerzog (1982) there are four conditions of conceptual change (see also Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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Strike & Posner, 1992, and Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993, for critical remarks on the 
initial theory): 
 
1- There must be dissatisfaction with current conceptions. 
2- A new conception must be intelligible.  
3- A new conception must be initially plausible.  
4- A new conception should suggest the possibility of a fruitful research 
program.  
 
The "mechanisms" of conceptual change are still mainly viewed in Piagetian 
terms of equilibration of assimilation and accommodation. Dissatisfaction results in 
disequilibrium of the mental balance so to speak. Assimilation (in case of minor 
revisions) or accommodation (in case of major restructuring) brings the balance back 
to equilibrium. The sketched process of conceptual change is not only facilitated by 
logical considerations but is deeply dependent on a number of affective and emotional 
factors (see for an overview of such factors table 2). These factors may be viewed as 
part of conditions that support conceptual change.  
 
 
What changes in conceptual change?  -- towards coexistence of students' 
conceptions and science conceptions  
 
More traditionally oriented approaches of science instruction often start from 
the idea that learning science conceptions means to replace students prior (alternative) 
conceptions for the new science conceptions. Research has shown that this idea is not 
adequate. Students commonly do not give up their prior conceptions totally. In 
everyday context they usually trust more in their prior everyday conceptions than in 
the newly learned science conceptions. Constructivist approaches have replaced the 
replacement perspective by a coexistence view. It holds that students have to learn that 
science conceptions are valuable and fruitful in certain contexts whereas students' 
alternative (everyday) conceptions allow a fruitful (viable) dealing with phenomena in 
other contexts (Jung, 1986). 
 
Hewson and Hewson (1992) discuss the issue of what changes in conceptual 
change from a slightly different perspective. They argue that change does not mean 
exchange (i.e., replacement) but change of status given to conceptions. Learning 
science then means that students give less status to their everyday conceptions in a 
smaller number of contexts whereas the status given to science conceptions increases 
accordingly.  
 
 
Supportive classroom climate and instructional settings 
 
A large variety of issues may be summarized under the supporting conditions of 
conceptual change. In general, instructional settings are designed that allow students to 
take responsibility of their learning processes and allow them to experience that Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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science knowledge may be meaningful and significant for them (compare Pintrich et 
al, 1993, 181). Project type approaches, more open forms of instruction (e.g., open 
experimentation; Roth, 1993), and authentic learning environments (Roth, in press) are 
some labels that may indicate key features of such approaches. Also ideas of situated 
and socially shared cognition (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Resnick, 1991) are 
among significant supporting conditions of conceptual change that address the aims of 
student centred science instruction as outlined above. Situated cognition briefly 
outlined, holds that all cognitive acts are situated in the context of the learning 
situation. The context is an integral part of what is learned. The context, the learning 
situation is not neutral so to speak. Situations co-produce knowledge (Brown et al, 
1989, 32). What is learned is inseparable from how it is learned.  
 
Taylor and Fraser (1991) have developed a "Constructivist Learning 
Environment Survey" to assess supporting classroom climates in the above sense. The 
four scales of their instrument reflect key issues that are also pointed out in many other 
constructivist approaches: 
 
"The Autonomy scale measures perceptions of the extent to which there are 
opportunities for students to exercise meaningful and deliberate control over their 
learning activities, and think independently of the teacher and other students. The Prior 
Knowledge scale measures perceptions of the extent to which there are opportunities 
for students meaningfully to integrate their prior knowledge and experiences with their 
newly constructed knowledge. The Negotiation scale measures perceptions of the 
extent to which there are opportunities for students to interact, negotiate meaning and 
build consensus. The Student-Centredness scale measures perceptions of the extent to 
which there are opportunities for students to experience learning as a process of 
creating and resolving personally problematic experiences." (Taylor & Fraser, 1991, 
2). 
 
A note of caution is necessary. The preference of the above sketched more open 
and more supportive instructional settings does not mean that more traditional forms of 
instruction like lecture type periods and whole class activities have no place in 
constructivist approaches. Also these may be efficient settings for particular purposes 
if students' needs and conceptions are addressed.  
 
 
Constructivist oriented development of new media for science instruction 
 
Constructivist perspectives have also influenced the development of new media 
substantially. Especially the development of computer inclusive designs have to be 
mentioned here. Linn and Burbules (1993), for instance, report about computers as 
"lab partners" in approaches to remediate students' alternative conceptions of 
temperature and heat. Goldberg and Bendall (1992) designed interactive computer-
video-based tutorial in geometrical optics. The c omputer, in general, can provide 
opportunities for dynamic displays and visualizations, simulations, and model building Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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(see e.g., Schecker, 1993; Henessy, Twigger, Driver, O'Shea, O'Malley, Draper, 
Hartley, Mohamed, & Scanlon, 1993). 
 
 
Constructivist textbooks for science instruction? 
 
Textbooks of a traditional type appear not to be suited for constructivist science 
instruction. Critiques of science textbooks have revealed a number of limitations of 
this kind of information source. Usually the learner's p erspective is not taken into 
consideration (Gallagher, 1991), and issues of the psychology of learning are 
neglected (Stinner, 1992). Furthermore, textbooks are usually written in a limited, 
authorial style (Strube, 1989) and they provide limited empiricist views of the nature 
of science (Sutton, 1989; Gallagher, 1991). But it appears that also constructivist 
approaches need some kind of a textbook in order to provide information to the 
students in an efficient way. Guzetti and Glass (1992) in a meta-analysis of studies on 
reading science text come to the conclusion that comprehension of science content can 
be enhanced significantly and that conceptual change can be promoted by the use of 
textbooks, provided that students' preconceptions are challenged in some way. 
Examples of what such a constructivist text could look like are provided by Duit, 
Häußler, Lauterbach, and Westphal (1992) from the development of a new physics 
textbooks for lower secondary level. In this book, students' conceptions are explicitly 
addressed as often as possible in different ways. Research on the success of this 
textbook in enhancing conceptual change has not been carried out so far. 
 
Constructivist assessment procedures  
Assessment has manifold functions in school. In more traditionally oriented 
approaches the pedagogical function, i.e., assessment as a means of helping students to 
learn, is given only scant attention. Constructivist approaches usually differ 
fundamentally from more traditional ones in this respect. Here the pedagogical 
function, the role of assessment among other supporting conditions of conceptual 
change is given key importance. The metaphor of portfolios (Duschl & Gitomer, 1991) 
is frequently used to indicate assessment techniques of the sketched type (see also 
Wolf, Bixby, Glenn, & Gardner, 1991). They allow the students to show different 
aspects of their understanding in a similar way as an artist may present pieces of her 
work from a portfolio. 
 
 
Pathways from students' pre-instructional conceptions to science conceptions 
 
The term conceptual change as understood in the present paper addresses 
pathways from students' pre-instructional conceptions to the science conceptions, 
particularly those pathways that need fundamental restructuring of already existing 
conceptual structures. The basic assumption is the key constructivist idea that 
construction of new conceptions (learning) is possible only on the basis of the already Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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existing conceptions. Figure 1 presents a classification of pathways that have been 
used in science education studies on conceptual change. The first key distinction 
concerns continuous and discontinuous pathways (see also above).  
 
 
 
 
Continuous pathways 
Continuous pathways try to "avoid" (or bypass) the fundamental restructuring 
necessary in case of the discontinuous pathways. They start from aspects of students' 
conceptual structures that are already mainly in accord with the science conceptions or 
reinterpret students ideas. In the first case, the kernel of harmony between the 
conception of departure (the "anchor", Brown & Clement, 1989) and the target 
conception is developed step by step. It is not necessary in every case to start from 
conceptions that students construct when dealing with the referring science phenomena 
and principles. It may also be possible to start from pieces of knowledge in domains 
where analogies may be drawn to structures or features of the science content in 
question. In the second case of "reinterpretation" (Jung, 1986) the strategy is a little 
different. Also here resemblances between students' preinstructional conceptions are 
the starting point but they are interpreted in a new way. It is a key finding of students' 
conceptions research in physics that students of all ages tend to think that whenever a 
body is moving into a certain direction that then a force has to act into this direction, 
that pulls the body so to speak into this direction (McDermott, 1984). This view is not 
correct from the Newtonian perspective of classical mechanics. Following the 
reinterpretation strategy students are not told that their conception as sketched is 
wrong but it is worked out step by step that they have something in mind that also 
makes good sense from the physics point of view. In fact, there is a physics quantity 
always pointing into the direction of the moving body. But this quantity is momentum 
and not force (Jung, 1986). Another example of the reinterpretation strategy is given 
by Grayson (in press). Concerning current flow in simple electric circuits students 
usually have the idea that current is consumed when flowing in the circuit, that some 
current is used up in the bulb so that less current enters the battery than left it. Also 
here students are not told that their ideas are wrong. On the contrary, the teacher 
encourages students' way of thinking and works out that they have something quite 
correct in mind. In fact there is something "used up" while current is flowing, namely Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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energy is transformed into heat and heat is dispersed. It becomes obvious that 
continuous approaches are in need of very careful reconstruction of the particular 
science subject matter structure. Usually such approaches are embedded in very basic 
changes of more traditionally oriented reconstructions of that kind. 
 
 
Discontinuous pathways 
In this case there is a stark contrast between students' conceptions and science 
conceptions. Cognitive conflict strategies play a key role in all approaches that fall into 
this category (see the review of such approaches by Scott, Asoko, & Driver, 1992). 
There are three primary kinds of cognitive conflict. First, there is the kind of conflict 
that is created by asking for students' predictions and then contrasting these to the 
experimental results. Secondly, there is a conflict between the ideas of the students and 
those of the teacher. Finally, there is a conflict among the beliefs of the students. 
Theoretical orientation of cognitive conflict usually is the above sketched Piagetian 
idea  that mental disequilibrium demands an interplay between assimilation and 
accommodation until equilibrium is restored (Dykstra, 1992; Rowell & Dawson, 
1985). Also Festinger's (1962) theory of cognitive dissonance is referred to (Driver & 
Erickson, 1983). The crucial issue in cognitive conflict strategies is whether students 
"see" the conflict. This is very often not the case. What appears to be clearly 
discrepant from the perspective of a teacher may be viewed only marginally different 
from the perspectives  of the students or not discrepant at all. Also the problems 
students have in dealing with anomalous data (see the review of Chinn and Brewer, 
1993) point to difficulties to really bring the cognitive balance out of equilibrium so to 
speak and to incite conceptual change processes. 
 
It may be interesting to note that discontinuous approaches that are deliberately 
based on Piagetian stage theory like the "Learning Cycle" (Lawson, Abraham, & 
Renner, 1989) and those that explicitly reject this theory (like Driver's, 1989, 
"Constructivist Teaching Sequence"; see figure 2) are only very marginally different 
with regard to addressing conceptual change -- because in the very end they are 
employing the same Piagetian ideas of conceptual change "mechanisms". The learning 
cycle comprises three phases (Lawson, 1989, 26-27): 
 
Exploration 
"Students learn through their own actions and reactions in a new 
situation. They explore new materials with minimal guidance. The new 
experience should raise questions or complexities that they cannot 
resolve with their present conceptions or accustomed patterns of 
reasoning. In other words, it provides the opportunity for students to 
voice potentially conflicting and at least partially inadequate ideas 
(misconceptions) that can spark debate and an analysis of the reasons for Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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their ideas. Exploration leads to the identification of regularity in a 
phenomenon..." 
 
Term Introduction 
The new term to label t he patterns discovered in the exploration stage is 
introduced. 
 
Concept Application 
"Students apply the new term and/or reasoning pattern to additional 
examples. The concept application phase is necessary for some students 
to recognize the patterns and separate it from its specific contexts and/or 
to generalize it to other contexts..." Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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The learning cycle and the constructivist teaching sequence share a period in 
which students are made familiar with the referring phenomena, in which they are also 
made aware of their ideas with many other approaches in use in science education. At 
some later stage, the science point of view is brought into debate and there is some sort 
of negotiation about the values of this view. At the end a review of the learning 
pathway is included that provides students with possibilities to reflect what they have 
learned.  
 
As mentioned above the conceptual change core usually is embedded in 
conditions that support conceptual change. Figure 3 provides a brief look at an 
example for the C onstructivist Teaching Sequence as presented in figure 2 (Scott, 
1992; see also Driver & Scott, in press), the outline of teaching the particle model. 
Students are given many opportunities to make their own experiences and to construct 
their own meaning of the phenomena observed. Also another key feature of 
constructivist approaches becomes apparent, namely considerations of the nature and 
range of scientific theory and theory making (see stage B. in figure 3). Students play a 
simple rule guessing game here. The teacher writes a number of names at the 
blackboard following a certain rule (e.g. only names with four letters). Students have 
to find out the rule via checking their ideas against evidences. The metaphor of a 
scientist as a detective is employed in another game in which students are provided 
with facts of a murder case. They work in groups in order to find out who the murder 
is. They have to check their hypotheses against the evidence provided. In much the 
same way they are invited later to check their theories of how matter is composed of 
particles against the evidences as provided in their experiments. 
 
 
To address or not to address students' conceptions explicitly  
 
In most conceptual change approaches either of the discontinuous or the 
continuous  kind there is some stage where students are made aware of their 
conceptions. Walter Jung and his co-workers have developed a totally different 
approach which falls into the category of continuous pathways. In elementary optics, 
for example, many very deeply rooted alternative conceptions have been found (Jung, 
1989). Students, for instance, do not view the process of seeing a lit object like a 
picture at the wall in terms of light reflected by the picture into the eyes but as 
something lying at the picture (namely light) that may be seen when turning the eyes 
to it. In their optic course (Wiesner, 1994) they never speak about this student idea but 
try to arrange a set of appropriately designed experiments and arguments to persuade 
students of the appropriateness of the science point of view. They argue against the 
cognitive conflict strategy that it is too time consuming and may lead students into the 
wrong direction. Their evaluation results show that their approach was significantly 
superior a traditional approach given to a control group. These findings point to the 
importance of conceptual change supporting reconstruction of science subject matter 
structures another time. If analyzed from the perspective of the above mentioned 
holistic constructivist approaches it becomes obvious that Walter Jung's approach is 
limited in scope in that key issues of the above sketched holistic constructivist Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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approaches are not addressed, in particular attempts are missing to support students' 
abilities to reflect about their own learning and hence to make them autonomous 
learners. 
 
 
Analogies and conceptual change  
Analogies and their relatives like metaphors play a significant role in 
conceptual change settings. Analogical reasoning is a key process in knowledge 
construction from a constructivist perspective (Duit, 1991). If understanding and 
learning is possible only on the basis of the already existing conceptions, the already 
available conceptions are scanned for similarities with the newly presented ones. 
Several studies on conceptual change employ analogies. But the success is varied. 
Whereas in some cases analogical reasoning has proven a potent facilitator of 
conceptual change in other studies this is not the case (for a review see Duit, 1991). A 
major reason for failures appears to be that analogical reasoning often cannot take 
place because the analogies presented to students are understood in a different way by 
the students than was intended (Duit & Glynn, 1992). Sometimes not even the analog 
domain, i.e., the domain that is the base of analogical reasoning is familiar to the 
students to the extent assumed by the presenters of the analogy.  Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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The most influential approach of employing analogies in conceptual change settings 
has been the "bridging analogies" approach by Brown and Clement (1989). It falls into 
the category of continuous pathways (figure 1). 
 
Two examples of "recipies" for addressing constructivist ideas in planning science 
instruction 
 
There is a rising number of attempts to provide teachers with guidelines how to 
address constructivist ideas in planning science instruction. Two examples of 
"recepies" are presented in tables 3 and 4. The first example (table 3) is quite 
pragmatic in nature. It stems from an article in a science teachers' journal (Yager, 
1991) and aims at making these teachers aware of key constructivist issues. The other 
example (table 4) has been worked out by the cognitive psychologist M. Wittrock 
(Wittrock, 1994) who has a long lasting interest in science education (Osborne & 
Wittrock, 1985). Here main issues of conceptual change and conceptual change 
supporting conditions are listed. The examples may serve the reader as tools to rethink 
the characteristics of constructivist science instruction outlined above in considering 
which characteristics are addressed there and which are not given sufficient attention. 
 
 
Success of conceptual change approaches in science education 
 
 
Providing evidence of success  of constructivist approaches is a somewhat 
difficult matter (Duit & Confrey, in press). It is very difficult to condense the results 
reported into measures that allow comparisons with traditional approaches. The reason 
is the above outlined holistic character of many constructivist approaches towards 
conceptual change which usually include fundamental restructuring of traditional 
approaches in many respects. Do the categories for comparison have come from the 
traditional approaches or from the new ones? Both are quite different concerning their 
aims. It appears to be possible only to evaluate these approaches with regard to their 
own aims, i.e., to investigate whether these approaches achieve their aims or not. 
 
 
Solomon (1994) in a recent review of advantages and problems of the 
contemporary use of constructivism in science education is rather reserved against 
constructivist teaching and learning approaches. With regard to the Children's 
Learning in Science project (Driver, 1989) she admits that much valuable work has 
been done but that a final judgment of the success of the teaching and learning 
methods employed is still not possible. In fact, there is reason for some reservations. 
Many studies on constructivist teaching and learning show only little success but there 
are also findings that appear to be most promising and that may indeed lead to the 
development of more successful approaches. 
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Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak  (1993) in a recent review of research on 
students' conceptions in science have analyzed 103 intervention studies. They 
conclude that the wide range of modification studies show varying levels of success. 
This is true for intervention studies of the confrontation type (the discontinuous 
pathway type) and of studies that employ analogies alike. They also address 
limitations of the nature of the referring studies: 
 
"A brief word of caution about the status of research on conceptual change 
seems in order. Much of this work is relatively recent in origin and, though promising, 
is probably best described as "exploratory" in nature. Many of the studies conducted to 
date have relied on small sample sizes, untested methods, anecdotal records, and 
relatively nonrigorous research designs lacking control group comparisons. Virtually 
none of the studies has been replicated. However, purely qualitative research continues 
to improve as research design keeps pace with advances in methods. So, even with the 
aforementioned caveats in mind, we remain impressed by the relative success some 
researchers have achieved to date." Wandersee, Mintzes, & Novak, 1993). Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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It appears that this statement adequately portrays the state of the art in the 
domain of conceptual change teaching and learning strategies in science education. It 
seems to be valid also on the basis of the other intervention studies available (the 
recent edition of the bibliography by Pfundt & Duit, 1994, lists about 600 intervention 
studies of many different kinds). 
 
A meta-analysis of conceptual change approaches in science education (Guzetti 
& Glass, 1992) included 70 studies investigating intervention studies in science 
education and in reading education (the latter on science issues). The type of analysis 
the authors employed only allowed the incorporation of studies that compared a 
treatment group and a control group. Therefore, major constructivist approaches Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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towards conceptual change, among them the leading ones like the Children's Learning 
in Science (CLIS) project in Leeds (Driver, 1989) were not regarded. Nevertheless, the 
findings show that there is a substantial amount of empirical evidence that challenging 
students' conceptions in some way usually results in significantly better outcomes than 
approaches that do not address students' conceptions explicitly. It appears that 
especially the theoretical assumptions of the theory of conceptual change (Posner, 
Strike, Hewson, & Gerzog, 1982), of the cognitive conflict strategies, and of the 
bridging analogies approach (Brown & Clement, 1989) are backed up by empirical 
findings on the basis of that meta-analysis: 
 
"Based on the accumulated evidence from two disciplines [reading and science 
education is meant here], we have found that instructional interventions designed to 
offend the intuitive conception were effective in promoting conceptual change. The 
format of the strategy (e.g. refutational text, bridging analogies, augmented activation 
activities) seems irrelevant, providing the nature of the strategy includes cognitive 
conflict. Despite recent self-criticism of their earlier positions (Strike & Posner, 1992), 
the genre of instructional strategies described earlier by Strike and Posner (1985) that 
produces dissatisfaction with current conceptions and show the scientific conception as 
intelligible, plausible and applicable, has been effective." (Guzetti & Glass, 1992, 42). 
 
There is therefore good reason for the optimistic view of Wandersee, Mintzes, 
and Novak (1993) as quoted above. Also further close cooperation of research in 
science education and cognitive science appears to be most promising in order to 
investigate both the fine structure of conceptual change processes and the impact of 
supporting conditions of conceptual change. Where analysis of the fine structure of 
conceptual change is concerned, there is an increasing number of interesting learning 
process studies in science education the past years (see the proceedings of a first 
conference on this issue by Duit, Goldberg, & Niedderer, 1992; see also Fischer & 
Aufschnaiter, 1993; Niedderer & Goldberg, 1993). 
 
 
 
Teacher change  -- constructivist approaches of pre  - and inservice teacher 
education 
 
Research has clearly shown that teachers are not usually ready to adopt 
constructivist teaching and learning approaches as sketched above without serious 
difficulties and distortions of the intentions of such approaches. Teachers' views of 
learning as well as their conceptions of science (i.e., their philosophy of science ideas) 
are limited basically in the same way as students' views and ideas of the same 
domains. Teachers usually hold a passive receiver view of learning, that neglects the 
active construction issue as addressed by constructivism, or at least mainly act in 
classroom practice as if they would be inclined to such a view (Baird & Mitchell, 
1986; Baird & Northfield, 1992). Also, most teachers hold a naive realist and 
empiricist view of science that does not take into account the issue of science 
knowledge being tentative human construction as seen from the constructivist Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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perspective. Further, a surprisingly large number of teachers, especially but not 
exclusively those who lack sufficient professional training, hold quite similar science 
conceptions on the content level as their students (see the referring section in the 
bibliography by Pfundt and Duit, 1994). Teacher change in various respects then is 
necessary if constructivist approaches of science instruction are to be more successful 
than traditional approaches. Many approaches of teacher inservice and preservice 
education have been developed and evaluated over the past decade (see the reports of 
the seminal PEEL project at Monash University in Melbourne by Baird & Mitchell, 
1986, and Baird & Northfield, 1992; for overviews see the sections in recent volumes 
on constructivist science education in Tobin, 1993a, and in Treagust, Duit, & Fraser, in 
press). 
 
The conceptual change model as developed by Posner, Strike, Hewson, & 
Gerzog (1982) has also proven to be a powerful theoretical framework for attempts to 
facilitate teacher change. As outlined above, the initial theory included four conditions 
of conceptual change, indicated by the labels dissatisfaction, intelligible, plausible, and 
fruitful. Gunstone and Northfield (1988) added a further condition, namely feasibility 
that points to the issue that teacher change may not occur although the new ideas are 
intelligible, plausible and fruitful because the teacher still places greater importance on 
the old ideas. Teacher change, as is also the case for student change, is a long lasting 
painstaking process (Gallagher, 1993), because changes fundamentally concern deep-
rooted beliefs that have been a significant part of the teacher's personality. Models of 
teacher change, therefore, start from domains where teachers feel comfortable and 
where only few changes appear to be necessary. From there step by step the need for 
further rethinking of current practice is developed. Teaching and preaching 
constructivist ideas is rejected. Teachers are, of course, informed about basic 
principles of that view in seminar like sessions and are also given publications that 
provide easy access to key constructivist ideas. But main concern is coaching teachers 
in the process of self-generating constructivist ideas to become what Schon (1983) has 
called a "reflective practitioner".  
 
 
Table 5 presents the constructivist model for teacher inservice developed by 
Hand & Treagust (in press). The table shows the five stages of the model, which kinds 
of changes are addressed and also in which way these changes fit the conditions of 
conceptual change. The step-wise strategy that is characteristic for constructivist 
models of teacher change is clearly to be identified. The change of teacher's role is a 
key issue. Here it is expressed in terms of change from a manager of classroom 
activities towards an empowerer, i.e., a person that actively supports students' 
construction processes by helping and encouraging them. Tobin (1993b) discusses the 
changes of teachers' role in his research program in terms of the change of teachers' 
metaphors. It is the basic assumption of this approach of teacher change that the 
beliefs and metaphors teacher hold about their role as teachers deeply influence their 
teaching behavior. Tobin (1993b, 217) provides, for instance, the case of the teacher 
Diana who holds three different metaphors: 
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"Diana used three metaphors to describe her teaching role in different 
contexts. Usually, she managed her class as a policewoman, in some 
circumstances she was a mother hen, and, on other occasions, she was an 
entertainer. Her mode of behavior (i.e., the metaphor she used to make 
sense of what she ought to do) depended on the context in which 
learning was to occur. And each conceptualization of her role as 
manager was associated with a discrete set of beliefs." 
 
 
Tobin (1993b) describes a number of further metaphors and changes of them 
that empowered the teachers to take a role in constructivist instructional settings that 
supports students' change processes. 
 
 
The constructivist view and science education for the 21st century 
 
The present paper is presented at a conference on "Science and Mathematics 
Education for the 21st Century". Are the changes of more traditional approaches of 
science instruction towards the visions as provided by the constructivist view are 
suited for dealing with the challenges students will meet in the next century? There is, 
of course, no simple and short answer to that question. It very much depends on the 
visions of future societies different people may hold. If the aim is a responsible and Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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reflective citizen, i.e., a person who is able to a certain extent to understand basic 
features of science concepts and ideas that will deeply influence also life in the 21st 
century (in desirable and also most fatal manners) then the deep understanding of 
science as underlying the constructivist view is a must so to speak. This understanding, 
namely, includes deep and applicable knowledge of science contents, insight into the 
role of science contents in technology and society (including issues of environmental 
concern) as well as comprehension of the nature of science knowledge (i.e., adequate 
philosophy of science views). There is another aspect of the vision the constructivist 
view provides that contributes to educating reflective and responsible citizens. 
Constructivist science education is humanistic in nature, it aims at supporting the 
development of the individual's personality. In that, I really think that the changes as 
proposed by the constructivist view have a lot to offer for the improvement of science 
education in order to empower students to deal with the challenges of their futures 
lives. 
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings it has to be pointed out that more 
traditionally oriented approaches are not in stark contrast to all the visions as provided 
by the constructivist view. Interestingly, there appears to be some sort or irony in that 
more traditional approaches share at least some key aims with constructivist ones but 
try to address them with teaching and learning methodologies that have proven 
unsuitable for that purpose in numerous empirical studies. In fact, there is almost 
nothing in constructivism that is really new. There is a constructivist tradition (under 
different labels, of course) in pedagogy and also in science education that dates quite 
far back into history (Jung, 1993; Duit, in press). A number of teaching methods, for 
instance, employed by constructivist science instruction settings like the Socratic 
dialog and the cognitive conflict are surely not new at all. The contemporary 
constructivism is part of student centred pedagogy of science teaching and learning. 
What is new with this view is that it encourages development of approaches of a 
student centred science instruction in the above broad meaning in a rather consistent 
way. The body of research on students' and teachers' conceptions of various kinds, as 
well as research on student and teacher change provide a much more reliable basis for 
setting students centred science instruction in practice than ever before in the history 
of science education. In that I think there will be lasting effects of the constructivist 
view. The constructivist view will, without any doubt, be most influential in science 
education also after the term constructivism will have gone out of fashion. 
 
A final note 
The present paper is included in a series of other review type papers that I have 
written over the past years for different purposes and with different emphases. It is for 
this reason that there are several overlaps with issues addressed also in other papers. It 
appears that this primarily concerns the following ones: Duit, Treagust, & Fraser (in 
press); Duit & Confrey (in press); and Duit (1993a). From the paper Duit (1993b) I 
transferred the paragraphs on "conception and perception", "conception and action" 
and "conception may override empirical evidence" from the paper Duit (1994) the Investigações em Ensino de Ciências – V1(1), pp.40-75, 1996 
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paragraphs on different pathways towards science conceptions and on the success of 
conceptual change approaches without major changes into the present paper. 
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Appendix 
Claims summarizing key findings of students conceptions research (from Wandersee, 
Mintzes, & Novak, 1993) 
 
Claim 1: Learners come to formal science instruction with a diverse set of alternative 
conceptions concerning natural objects and events. 
Claim 2: The alternative conceptions that learners bring to formal science instruction 
cut across age, ability, gender, and cultural boundaries. 
Claim 3: Alternative conceptions are tenacious and resistant to extinction by 
conventional teaching strategies. 
Claim 4: Alternative conceptions often parallel explanations of natural phenomena 
offered by previous generations of scientist and philosophers. 
Claim 5: Alternative conceptions have their origins in a diverse set of personal 
experiences including direct observation and perception, peer culture and language, as 
well as in teachers' explanations and instructional materials. 
Claim 6: Teacher often subscribe to the same alternative conceptions as their students. 
Claim 7: Learners' prior knowledge interacts with knowledge presented in formal 
instruction, resulting in a diverse set of unintended learning outcomes. 
Claim 8: Instructional approaches which facilitate conceptual change can be effective 
classroom tools. 